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Hardman: Lie Detectors, Extrajudicial Investigations and the Courts
LIE DETECTORS.
EXTRAJUDICIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND THE COURTS

THoMAS P.

HARDALA

T

HAT conscious falsification usually causes certain emotional
disturbances on the part of the person falsifying and that
these disturbances commonly manifest themselves in physical reaction (voice or manner) is a phenomenon that has long since been
known to both the layman and the scientist. Conscious volition to
repress the truth without actually substituting a false imaginative
utterance ordinarily arouses similar emotive forces.' But to what
extent these perturbations can be measured and recorded by socalled lie detectors in terms of change in blood pressure, respiration
and galvanic reaction, and to what extent these changes can be
interpreted in terms of truth or falsity is still a much-mooted question and one that challenges the courts as well as psychologists and
criminologists.
In preliminary investigations as distinguished from judicial
procedures, the use of the lie detector (blood-pressure method,
respiration method, galvanometer method) has beyond doubt passed
from the experimental to the demonstrable stage as an instrument
for determining whether the accused or a suspect is consciously lying,
and though it is admittedly not an infallible device for ascertaining
the truth, its great usefulness is seldom questioned in this field.'
Indeed its psychological value as a gadget for eliciting confessions
Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
1 This is particularly so when a charge of some consequence has been made

against the person under observation or when there is a suspicion of such a
charge, so that there is present a very real fear of detection. As to the
psycho-physiology of the lie, see WIG oR, SCIENCE OP JUDICIAL PROOF (1937)
§ 269 et seq. See also WIGUORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 999. That emotional disturbances recorded on lie detectors are the same or substantially the
same whether the accused or a suspect actually answers the questions put by
the psychometrist, see Inbau, Scientific Evidence in CriminaZ Cases (1934) 24
J. CRm. L. 1140, 1152. See, in general, McCormick, Deception-Tests and the
Law of Evidence (1927) 15 CALIF. L. REV. 484; LARSON, LYING AND ITS
DETECTION (1932); Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique Admitted as
Evidence (1935) 26 J. Crm. L. 262; Forkosch, The Lie Detector and The
Courts (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 202; Trovillo, A History of Lie
Detection (1939) 29J. Crm. L. 848, 30 id. at 104.
2See, e.g., WiG oE, SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PRooF (1937) § 314: "The
practicaZ uses of the polygraph (blood-pressure method) have been fully established by the experience at the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of
Northwestern University-not only in police inquiries, but in commercial personnel administration."
See also Inbau, Scientifitc Evidence in Criminal
Cases (1934) 24 J. C=nm. L. 1140.
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is now established by ample and incontestable data, and of course a
confession is not inadmissible merely because so obtained.3
But how far, if at all, the recorded physical reactions may be
used as evidence of innocence or guilt is quite another matter, and
with respect to this problem most courts have as yet refused to
sanction the lie-detector method of discovering facts.4 There are,
however, some rather recent lower court decisions, mostly unreported, in which this use of such scientific instruments has been
sanctioned and the question therefore arises whether, in the light
of the widespread present-day acceptance of the general usefulness of this psychometric method, the time has not arrived for a
judicial re-examination of the admissibility of evidence based on
such deception tests If expert-opinion evidence is permissible as
to analogous scientific matters, e.g., as to X-ray and psychiatric
examinations, in which the best of scientists not infrequently differ as to their conclusions,3 why should courts be unwilling to admit
this particular kind of opinion evidence, provided of course that
the psychometrist is a duly qualified expert on the subject? If the
acceptance of such evidence would tend in any substantial degree to
increase the probabilities of arriving at the truth in a case, is there
any sound objection, in view of recent advancements in lie-detector
methods, to admitting the evidence for what it may be worth?
It has been suggested by some that the admission of such evidence would violate the privilege against self-incrimination unless
3 See Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A. (2d) 353 (1939) ; Commonwealth v. Jones, 19 A. (2d) 389 (Pa. 1941). As to the ldnd of "Icompulsion"
that will render a confession "involuntary" and inadmissible, see State v.
Goldizen, 93 W. Va. 328, 116 S.E. 687 (1923); Wan v. United States, 266
U. S.1, 45 S. Ct. 1, 69 L. Ed. 131 (1924). To be sure, if such invalidating
compulsion is used in securing an achnowledgment of guilt while the subject
is undergoing a deception test, the confession is inadmissible. See also Wiomoit, EVmENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 822 et seq. Cf. Green, Can Soikmw Legally
Gat the Confession? (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 808.
4 Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (App. D. C. 1923); State v. Bohner,
210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314, 86 A. L. R. 611 (1933). These cases are discussed, infra, in the body of this article.
5 See, e.g., Griffith v. American Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 686, 84 S. E. 621
(1915) (X-ray); Neill v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 119 W. Va. 694, 195
S. E. 860 (1938) (X-ray); People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 N. W. 387
(1929) (nymphomania); Mi]ler v. State, 49 Ohla. Cr. 133, 295 Pac. 403
(1930) (nymphomania); Rice v. State, 195 Wis. 181, 217 N. W. 697 (1928)
(perverted mind). But of. State v. Driver, 88 W. Va. 479, 107 S. E. 189
(1921). Here a qualified expert was not allowed to testify (for purposes of
impeachment) as to mental abnormality causing proneness to lie. See WiGMORE, EVImENC (2d ed. 1923) § 934 in the footnotes as to the soundness of
this case.

See also WIGMORE, EVEDENCE (3d ed. 1940)
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the accused or suspect voluntarily subjects himself to the test.
Such an objection, however, seems untenable, for despite some dissent it is now generally held that the privilege applies only to compelled testimony as distinguished from nontestimonial evidenceJ
and it would seem that the recordations of a lie detector do not
constitute a testimonial utterance within the meaning of the privilege inasmuch as the evidentiary value of the data sought to be used
in court lies in the physical reaction of the person subjected to the
test rather than in the words used by him. That this is so is indicated by the fact, among others, that the recordations are substantially the same whether the person taking the test answers the
questions or remains silent.$ The privilege against self-incrimination
closes one of the doors to truth and therefore courts are inclined, and
rightly, to confine the privilege within narrow limits and so to refuse to apply it to compelled nontestimonial data. For example,
according to the better view the privilege does not apply to involuntary X-rays,' or involuntary finger-printing, 10 or to requiring one
to stand up in court for purposes of identification, 1' or even to utter

0 JONES, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) § 885a, apparently supports the suggestion
though the point is not specifically noted: "The . . . immunity from self-

incrimination embraces within its protection the acts and conduct of a witness as well as his words."
7 A leading case on the subject is People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N.
E. 1003 (1894) (compelling accused to stand up in court for identification):
"The history of the constitutional privilege ... clearly demonstrates that it
The main purpose of the prowas not intended to reach a case like this ....
vision was to prohibit the compulsory oral examination of the prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in crime." See accord as to compulsory X-ray,
State v. Coleman, 96 W. Va. 544, 123 S. E. 580 (1924). That most courts now
follow this view, see WIGoan, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2265.
8 See Inbau, Sientifo Evidence in CriminaZ Cases (1934) 24 J. CRr. L.
1140, 1152. See McCormick, supra note 1, at 502: "since the association-word
responses and even the answers to questions incident to the test are not used
testimonially, i.e., as statements of facts to show the truth, there would seem to

be no legal obstacle to compelling by court order the submission to the test...

on the ground of ... privilege against self-crimination. The analogy is rather
to the forced giving of finger prints, specimens of handwriting, or the like."
See Note (1931) 44 HAav. L. REv. 842: "since the words spoken do not in
themselves express ideas, they would not be testimony in any ordinary sense."
Of. Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-LegaZ Aspects of the Mlood Test to Determine
Intoxication (1939) 24 IOWA L. REv. 191.
9 State v. Coleman, 96 W. Va. 544, 123 S. E. 580 (1924).
10 State v. Johnson, 111 W. Va. 653, 164 S. E. 31 (1932) (making fingerprints, on demand, without objection, the reasoning of the court indicating that
an objection would have made no difference). See Wm0RE, EVIDENCE (3d ed.
1940) § 2265; Kidd, The Bight to Take Fingerprints, Measurements and
Photographs (1919) 8 CsArs. L. REV. 25.
2-1 People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003 (1894).
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words for purposes of identifying the speaker, 2 and no reason of
policy is perceived why the physical reactions evidenced by a compulsory deception test should not be placed in the same category as
13
other nontestimonial matters.
Another objection which may be made with considerable
plausibility is the generally acknowledged fact that the lie detector
has little or no efficacy in dealing with certain types of individuals.
Outstanding examples are the moron who may not understand the
questions and may not experience the all-essential fear of detection, 4 the callously indifferent (usually a "repeater"), 5 and
the extremely corpulent person."8 But these are not the normal
types and the competent psychometrist, who alone may qualify as
operator or witness, knows how to make allowances for these exceptional classifications. Hence this objection, too, presents no
serious obstacle to the admission of such evidence.
What then are the major considerations which might be
thought to justify a reconsideration of the question whether examination in open court is not only the best means of ascertaining the
truth, as common-law judges have opined for centuries, but the
means which must be used to the exclusion of any of the so-called
lie-detector methods !
When the problem was originally presented to an appellate
court in 1923, in the case of Frye v. United States 7 the science of
detecting lies by other than traditional means was still indeed in
the experimental stage. There was as yet no general acceptance
in the scientific world of the reliability of the particular deception
test (blood-pressure method) which the judges were then asked to
'-Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 9 AtL 78 (1887) (dictum). Cf.
Commonwealth v. Valeroso, 273 Pa. 213, 116 Ati. 828 (1922). See Woiaaom,
EvIDE-N C (2d ed. 1923) § 2265: "Requiring him [the accused] to speak words
for identification of his voice is no more than requiring the revelation of a
physical mark."
Such voice sounds are "real evidence", not testimonial
utterances.
' See WisonE, Evm
cxcE
(3d ed. 1940) § 2265, treating the problem of
"lobtaining answers by questions and recording them on the polygraph or
'lie-detector' " under the heading of "Bodily Condition" (Finger Prints,
Medical Examination, etc.): "The modem tendency, everywhere, is against
the loose extension of the privilege." In addition to authorities cited sapra
note 8, see Inbau, Self-Incriminaton- What Can an Accused Person Be Coinpelled to Do? (1937) 28 J. Cnmr. L. 261.
" See Trovillo, What the Lie-Detector Can't Do, (1941) 32 J. Cmu. L. 121.

15TIbid.
'OId at p. 124.

Other examples of types of individuals upon whom the lie

detector does not ordinarily function efficiently are, (1) the insane, (2) those

under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (3) those who have recently received some serious injury. See Trovillo, supra note 14.
'7293 Fed. 1013 (App. D. C. 1923).
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sanction. That a court should not accept a scientific device until
science accepts it is a proposition that few would deny. The court
was therefore on sound ground in holding in that case that the
results of such a test were not (then) admissible in evidence.
Ten years elapsed before the problem was again presented to
an appellate tribunal." And again the same lie-detector method
(blood-pressure test) was called in question. In the meantime,
however, much experimentation had taken place. More than ten
thousand extrajudicial examinations had been conducted with this
kind of lie detector and when the court was asked to sanction the
use at trial of the results obtained by the lie detector there was an
offer of proof that seventy-five per cent of those upon whom it had
been employed had confessed their guilt upon completion of a
second test with this particular device. Nevertheless the court declined to sanction this method, relying with considerable conservatism on the earlier decision. The conclusion reached in the
case may be justified on the ground that the blood-pressure method
of valuating witnesses had not yet received the requisite general
recognition in the scientific world. However, the case was decided
in 1933 and not only has a vast amount of experimentation taken
place since then but a much more general recognition has since
been accorded to deception tests by men of science. Furthermore and this is important - these early or comparatively early cases
involved only one kind of test, namely, the blood-pressure method.
There are, however, two other kinds of detector tests that have
received a wide measure of scientific sanction, viz., the respiration
method' 9 and the galvanometer method.2" Then too there are not
a few scientists who regard any one method as more or less inadequate when used alone yet consider a combination of these methods
highly reliable. This does not mean that these scientists, or all of
them at least, do not consider any one of these methods as sufficiently reliable to justify a use, in preliminary investigations at
1 State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).

19 "This method has not been developed as an independent one."
See
WIGrOR , SOMNCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 316. It is now usually combined with
the blood-pressure method or the galvanometer method. For a description of
the respiration method, see McCormick, supra note 1. See also Trovillo, A
History of Lie DetectiOn (1939) 29 J. Camr. L. 848.
2b This method "measures the variation in resistance of the skin to electriccurrents administered during emotional disturbances, the variations being attributable to changes in the activity of the sweat-glands." Wimon, EviDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 999. See Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection (1939)
30 3. Cant. L. 104; Forkosch, supra note 1; Winter, A Comparison of the
Cardio-2Pneumo-Psychograph and Association Methods in the Detection of
Lying in Cases of Theft Among College Students (1936) 20 J. or APrrim

San~oE 243.
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any rate, of its results without a corroborative use of one or more
of the other methods; it means rather, among other things, that
since admittedly no one method is infallible with every type of
individual a combination of two or, preferably, all three methods
is, in general, more likely to reduce the margin, of possible error a fact that may play a major role in court in the not distant future.
And it means (without making comparisons as to the respective
merits of the various methods) that a decision by a court dealing
with any one deception test is not necessarily a precedent when a
case involving one of the other tests or any combination of tests is
presented for judicial sanction. Indeed this line of differentiation
may well be the turning point in the law as to the admissibility of
evidence based on data obtained extrajudicially by lie-detector
methods. In fact this differentiation was adopted in almost so many
2
words in the first and apparently only reported case ' in which this
use of such evidence has been expressly approved.
'
In that case, People v. Kenny,r decided in 1938 by a lower
New York court, the deception test sought to be sanctioned was
not the blood-pressure method (which, as has already been indicated, had been disallowed by the courts in the only applicable precedents), but a quite different kind of test, namely, the galvanometer method. There expert opinion based on the results of a
preliminary investigation with a lie detector was offered in evidence for the accused. It appeared that the particular kind of
machine there employed (a pathometer or psychogalvanometer)
had been tested upon more than 6,000 individuals and that the device when used upon persons accused of crime had proved to be
23
efficient in an overwhelming percentage of the cases investigated.
In a liberal opinion disposing of the contention that the scientific
principle involved in such a deception test had not yet reached
2' State v. Loviello and Grigano, (1935) Circuit Court of Columbia County,
Wis., is one of the first unreported cases in which a court of law permitted

such evidence for the consideration of a jury. For an account of this case,
see Inbau, Detection of Deception Tec7nique Admitted as Evidene (1935) 26
J. Cnm. L. 262.
22167 Msc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (1938).
23 "In one laboratory test, 271 persons were examined. The results of this
examination showed that 49 of the 50 guilty persons were detected by this procedure. In the accomplice group, of 102 persons 100 were detected. In the
innocent group of 119 persons all were detected.
"During the preliminary examination of Father Summers by the district
attorney, Father Summers testified that by reason of the realistic circumstances the emotional reactions of those who are actually accused of crime
are more intense and readily ascertainable than in laboratory tests, and he expressed the firn conviction, based upon his extended investigations, that the
device when thus employed is 100 per cent. efficient and accurate in the detection of deception."
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the demonstrable stage and had not yet received sufficient acceptance in the scientific world, the court, per Colden, J., said:
"Objection to the use of scientific proof is not at all
novel. At one time or another in their development testimony
as to fingerprints, as to X-rays, as to handwriting, as to bullet markings and as to psychiatric examinations were all refused admission into evidence. . . . Their gradual admission

into evidence came only after many rebuffs and rejections at
the hands of various courts Today their right to admission in
evidence is firmly intrenched in our law. Yet the deductions
of handwriting experts and of psychiatrists are not all uniform,
and we frequently have such experts testifying in our law
courts and drawing conficting inferences from their examinations. Despite the fact that such experts frequently differ
in their conclusions, their testimony is received in evidence,
and it is left to a jury to determine which, if either, expert or
experts they are going to believe and accept. .

.

. Both upon

legal principle and sound reasoning, it would seem that the
courts, if willing to accept and receive handwriting testimony,
psychiatric testimony and other such expert opinion, should
also admit in evidence testimony of the pathometer test and
the results disclosed thereby when a proper foundation has
been laid therefor.
"For hundreds of years our courts have deemed the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court
to be the best method so far devised for the ascertainment of
the truth and have used that method for lack of any better
approach. It seems to me that this pathometer and the technique by which it is used indicate a new and more scientific
approach2 4 to the ascertainment of truth in legal investigations."

The decision is important. Is it valid? And should courts
generally accept the conclusions therein reached? In dealing with
this sort of question the leading authority on evidence makes the
following pertinent observation:
"Both law and practice permit the calling of any expert
scientist whose method is acknowledged in his science to be a
sound and trustworthy one. Whenever the Psychologist is
really ready for the Courts, the Courts are ready for him."
"If there is ever devised a psychological test for the valuation
of witnesses, the law will run to meet it."2 5
But to date the law has not done a great deal of running to
meet this particular psychological test -a test which is widely accepted nowadays in the nonlegal scientific world as being efficient
24 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (1938) at p. 351.
25 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)

§

875.
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to a degree that rises, according to some eminent psychologists, as
bigh as ninety per cent or more and seldom sinks as low as seventy
per cent.- Should the courts then insist on a greater degree of
accuracy than that above indicated before they accept this particular scientific device ?
As to the general problem of the quantum of probative value
required, the following classic statement by Cooley, J., in Stewart
v. People, is sufficiently representative of the general judicial
attitude:
"The proper test for admissibility of evidence ought to be,
we think, whether it has a tendency to effect belief in the mind
of a reasonably cautious person, who should receive and weigh
it with judicial fairness."
That the law does not require a probative value greater than
that indicated by Judge Cooley is reasonably clear, for certainty
is rarely attainable in a trial and to require a degree of probativeness in excess of that laid down in the above statement would, as
another eminent judge puts it, 28 "sweep away many sources of
testimony to which men daily recur in the ordinary business of life,
and that cannot be rejected by a judicial tribunal, without hazard
of shutting out the light." Hence even the margin of probabilities
involved in the estimated minimum efficiency of the lie-detector
method would seem to fall well within the general judicial requirement, and this margin of probativeness may perhaps be regarded
as all the more acceptable in view of the unfortunate but undeniable
fact that in a high percentage of the cases the witness on the stand
not only lies but escapes detection by the traditional method of
examination.
It would seem therefore that the chief hurdle in the way of
judicial acceptance of this kind of opinion evidence is lack of
precedent. And as to this sort of legal obstacle, the following
statement by Mr. Justice Steinbrink would seem a sufficient answer:
26 See, e.g., People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (1938),
where an eminent psychologist of wide experience testified that the results of
hundreds of examinations indicated an efficiency approaching 100 per cent.
This, however, is an exceptionally high estimate. See, in general, LARSON,
LYING AND ITS DETECTIoN; Thbau, supra note 2; Note (1938) 29 J. CRnr. L.
287. Cf. Keeler, Debunking the Lie Detector (1934) 25 J. Cami. L. 153.
27 23 Mich. 63 (1871).
28 Bell, J., in Stevenson v. Stewart, 11 Pa. 307, 309 (1849).

19 Cf. McCormick, supra note 1, at 499-500: "Conscious perjury is too often
triumphant in our courts under our present methods of ascertaining truth for
us to assume too complacent a confidence in the sovereign remedy of crossexamination. It is not always the weakling who is being cross-examined, nor
the soul-searching terror to evil-doers who is conducting the examination. Successful exposure of the lie from the liar's lips requires cleverness and in-
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"Law and jurisprudence, which are something more than
the dry tomes of the past, can be understood by considering
fundamental principles not only of government and economics
but also at times by giving consideration in particular cases to
sociology, medicine, or other sciences.... New concepts must
beat down the crystallized resistance of the legally trained
mind that always seeks precedent before the new is accepted
into the30law. Frequently we must look ahead and not backwards."
By thus looking ahead in the Kenny case, Judge Colden has
taken a significant step which other courts may soon follow. In
fact the highest court of the state in which the learned judge sits has
not wholly refused to follow the lead, for it has since handed down a
decision, People v. Forte,"' which not only refrains from disapproving the Kenny case 32 but by implication may perhaps be construed as giving a measure of sanction to the psychometric method
of ascertaining the truth. In this case the New York Court of
Appeals was called upon to determine whether a lower court had
erred in refusing to permit the accused to be examined by a deception test (galvanometer method) and to submit the result of
such test to the jury. The request for such permission came by
way of a motion to reopen the case after all the evidence had been
produced for the jury's consideration. In holding that error had
not been conunitted the court ruled that it could not take judicial
notice that this scientific device was effective for the purpose of determining the truth and also gave some indication of the course
that might perhaps have been pursued with success. Said the court:
"The record is devoid of evidence tending to show a
general scientific recognition that the pathometer possesses
efficacy. Evidence relating to handwriting, finger printing and
ballistics is recognized by experts as possessing such value that
reasonable certainty can follow from tests. Until such a fact,
if it be a fact, is demonstrated by qualified experts in respect
to the 'lie detector', we cannot hold as a matter of law that
tuition in the cross-examiner which is all too often not forthcoming. If science bids fair to furnish a fairly effective technique for the exposure of deception we should not merely welcome it when it comes, but stimulate and encourage efforts to speed its coming."
3oBeuschel v. Manoitz, 151 Misc. 899, 271 N. Y. Supp. 277, 278 (1934).
31279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. B. (2d) 31 (1938).
39 In the Kenny case the court (a lower court) seems to have thought that
there was sufficient proof of general scientific recognition and so admitted
the evidence. In the Forte case the lower court thought that there was no such
proof and so rejected a request of the defendant's counsel that he be permitted
to take the defendant to a laboratory in an adjoining county to be examined
under a "lie detector" (galvanometer method). The request came after all
the evidence had been produced for the jury's consideration and as a motion
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error was committed in refusing to allow defendant to experiment with it.''"

This case was decided in 1938. The court was doubtless right
as of that date in refusing to take judicial notice of the scientific
recognition that was then accorded to the lie detector in question, for
a court should require proof of a scientific fact unless there is such a
general recognition of the fact in the scientific world that it can
be said to be a matter of "common knowledge". 3 The case may
have been lost because counsel did not present proper evidence as
to the recognition accorded by competent scientists to this particular dnd of lie detector.
The case does not hold, it should be noted, that the recordations
of a lie detector may not be used at trial as the basis for expertopinion evidence. On the contrary, the court clearly intimates that
upon adequate proof that general scientific recognition is accorded
a particular psychometric method the court may sanction the use
of such evidence. Between the lines the case all but opens the door
for the admission of evidence based on data obtained extrajudicially
by a deception test, provided of course that there is a showing of
a general scientific recognition of the particular device used or proposed to be used, and provided of course that the particular test is
made or is proposed to be made by a competent psychometrist. At
least the case may be so regarded by those who believe, as many now
do, that judicial approval of the psychometric method of ascertaining facts would constitute one more step, and a soundly scientific
one, in the advancement of the administration of justice, and within the limits above indicated no reason is perceived why courts
generally should not soon bestow approval. For within these limits
within these safeguards - the possibility of error inherent in
the present-day use of lie detectors seems materially outweighed
by the opposing possibility of closing the door to truth.
to reopen the case. The court of appeals in the Forte case therefore merely decided that it could not hold as a matter of law that error was committed in
refusing to allow the defendant to reopen the case and be subjected to the
deception test. Hence the Forte case did not overrule the Kenny case Sub
silentio.
33 People v. Forte, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. (2d) 31 (1938).
34As to the "notoriousness" which courts require before they will take
judicial notice of a fact, see, in general, Simmons v. Trumbo, 9 W. Va. 358
(1876); Lewis Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery Supply Co., 59 W. Va. 75, 52
S. E. 1017 (1906); Martin v. Carter Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 653, 84 S.E. 574
(1915); State v. Kittle, 87 W. Va. 526, 105 S.E. 775 (1921); Brown v. Bottom Creek Coal & Coke Co., 94 W. Va. 287, 118 S.E. 284 (1923). See also
WixomE, EvmENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2565 et seq.
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